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Introduction 
According to received wisdom from academic research and the international 
community, effective responses to the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa rest 
on the role of the state. States have been identified as the main leaders and 
managers of HIV/AIDS programmes, and have been sought by donors and 
international organisations to accept and internalise dominant approaches to 
responding to this crisis. What is of concern, however, is that this over-arching 
emphasis is not initiated by the individual governments themselves, but is donor-
led and donor-designed, specifically by the World Bank. Understandings of the 
state and HIV/AIDS focus upon the socio-economic impact of the epidemic, whilst 
failing to consider the effect of the international financial commitments and 
organisations that have come to form the global response and wider constructions 
of governance reform that the response operates within. This paper argues that 
through its Multi-Country AIDS Programme (MAP), the Bank has operationalised 
the reform measures it prioritised in the mid-1990s. This has confronted issues of 
state sovereignty within Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and due to the global 
nature of the epidemic, and the Bank’s role within it, set the foundations for wider 
absorption of the Bank’s particular form of governance reform. To understand the 
inter-relationship between the AIDS epidemic and the state, it is crucial to unravel 
the role of the World Bank. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, the paper positions itself 
within the current debate surrounding the inter-relationship between HIV/AIDS 
interventions and the state, highlighting what is known, and what is ignored about 
the impact of the global response.  Second, the paper outlines how directives by 
international organisations have placed the role of the state at the centre of 
HIV/AIDS responses. The paper then considers how the Bank’s AIDS interventions 
fit within the wider governance reform projects of the 1990s, and the relationship 
between existing research on such reform and the MAP. Fourth, the paper 
explores the impact of the response upon the role of the National AIDS Councils 
(NACs), the Ministries of Health, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and the 
President, and how it has confronted boundaries of state sovereignty, and fits in 
with wider patterns of implementation of the Bank’s governance reform agenda. 
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The paper’s main findings and contributions are then drawn together in 
conclusion.1  
 
What We Know about the State and AIDS 
Questions of the impact of HIV/AIDS upon the state are not new. Research into the 
socio-economic measures and outcomes of the epidemic raises concerns over the 
capacity of states to address HIV/AIDS. Capacity in this instance has mainly 
referred to the money and political commitments needed to ensure widespread 
healthcare provision from basic palliative care to the availability of testing kits and 
anti-retroviral therapy (ART), and universal free primary education, specifically to 
target girls. The ability of states to address these issues has been undermined by a 
number of factors. First, state infrastructure is weak where a high death rate of 
state workers or civil servants exists. Death in this instance reduces government 
consistency and experience, and leads to under-staffing. Moreover, death of 
elected officials undermines democratic practice and the realisation of long term 
strategic plans in combating the epidemic.2 
Second, countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are often poor 
‘fractured societies’ with weak state infrastructure and often lacking in the financial 
resources to provide healthcare for all. As Whiteside argues, state capacity in 
healthcare provision has been weakened by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank prescribed structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early 
1990s, which opened provision to the market and thus reduced state intervention in 
basic services, exacerbated poverty, and reduced budgetary spending on health, 
thus undermining the capacity of African governments to deal with the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. The link between poverty and HIV/AIDS cannot be extrapolated from 
wider structural impacts and inequalities resulting from globalization. Health care 
and education structures have been weakened through the transfer of resources 
from African countries in the form of $13.5 billion in debt per year. Export promotion 
                                                 
1 The main findings of the paper are based upon research into the activities of the World Bank’s 
Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 2004-2007. This 
research consisted of 163 semi-structured interviews with government officials, the Bank, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies and donors, and CSOs; 50 issued questionnaires, participant 
observation of community meetings and partnership forums.  
2 For the relationship between AIDS and state capacity see: T. Barnett, and A. Whiteside, AIDS in 
the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization (London: Palgrave, 2002); K. Chirambo, ‘AIDS 
and Democracy in Africa’ in N. Poku, A. Whiteside, and B. Snadkjaer, AIDS and Governance 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 67-92; A. deWaal, ‘How will HIV/AIDS transform African governance?’ 
African Affairs 102(406), 2003: 1-23.  
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and debt repayment resulted in cuts in public welfare spending. The impact of debt 
burden and structural adjustment has seen a shift away from approaches to health 
that were based upon social justice and equity in provision to approaches that view 
such provision as a threat to public finances and therefore not productive for 
human development and economic growth.3 Subsequently, the conditionalities 
placed on countries that received structural adjustment loans have framed the 
welfare systems of countries that are now tackling high HIV/AIDS prevalence 
levels, and, as a result, the majority of such countries suffer from under-staffed and 
under-funded health systems. As Poku has explained the situation, ‘at a time when 
up to 70 per cent of adults in some hospitals are suffering from AIDS-related 
illnesses. Many African countries have had to cut their health expenditure in order 
to satisfy IMF and World Bank conditionalities’.4 
Third, high death rates of people of working age affects countries’ labour 
productivity and position within global knowledge economies. This particularly 
impacts upon small business and micro-enterprise as a tool of poverty reduction 
that bear the cost of this high prevalence rate. 90% of deaths from HIV/AIDS affect 
adults aged 20-49 and half of those infected are aged 15-24 - the most productive 
working age for labour based economies.5 Thus, productivity is reduced as 
absenteeism through sickness increases, people die, recruitment and training costs 
increase, and investors lack incentive to commit funds to countries where 
HIV/AIDS threatens returns in investment. Businesses avoid such problems by 
investing in areas and setting up production sites where there is no, or a low 
prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS; mandatory testing of potential employees; and 
movement towards low labour production methods. Thus, global corporations lack 
incentive to invest in countries with high prevalence levels, and job opportunities 
within the global economy are reduced, and the cycle of poverty continues. This is 
compounded by a ‘brain drain’ of highly skilled workers from developing countries 
with high rates of HIV/AIDS that travel abroad for better wages. According to 
                                                 
3 For further information on the inter-relationship between debt, conditionalities, and AIDS see: T. 
Barnett and A. Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization; F. Cheru, 
‘Debt, adjustment and the politics of effective response to HIV/AIDS in Africa’ Third World Quarterly 
23(2), 2002: 299-312; K. Chirambo, ‘AIDS and Democracy in Africa’; R. Peet, Unholy Trinity: The 
IMF, World Bank and WTO (London: Zed Books, 2003), p141; A. deWaal, ‘How will HIV/AIDS 
transform African governance?’; N.K. Poku, ‘Poverty, debt, and Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis’ 
International Affairs 78(3), 2002: 531-546; N.K. Poku and B. Sandkjaer, ‘HIV/AIDS and the African 
State’ in N.K. Poku, A. Whiteside, B. Sandkjaer AIDS and Governance (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 
1-28; A. Whiteside, ‘Poverty and HIV/AIDS in Africa’ Third World Quarterly 23(2), 2002: 313-332. 
4 N.K. Poku, ‘Poverty, debt, and Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis’, p. 538. AIDS-related illnesses here refers 
to opportunistic infections such as tuberculosis and pneumonia. 
5 N.K. Poku and B. Sandkjaer, ‘HIV/AIDS and the African State’. 
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Barnett, it is important not to over-generalise the impact of the epidemic on the 
state, as it is a ‘long wave’ event that will have a differing impact upon the types of 
states it affects.6 
Despite these factors, academic emphasis upon the role of government and 
the state in leading the response to HIV/AIDS remains. The role of the government 
is crucial as only it can put HIV/AIDS at the centre of the national agenda, create 
favourable conditions for other actors to play their role, and protect the poor and 
vulnerable. Lack of government ownership and response to their individual 
country’s crisis sets a model for people, who believe that if the government is not 
taking the epidemic seriously then neither should they; doubts are subsequently 
reinforced, and stigma and misunderstanding continues.7 This emphasis has been 
met by a series of incentives by international organisations such as the United 
Nations (UN) and World Bank to place states, or more particularly governments, at 
the centre of the HIV/AIDS response.  
The role of government became the nucleus of HIV/AIDS activity during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. This was in part reaction to evidence from countries 
such as Brazil and Uganda that were deemed ‘success stories’ by the international 
development community in their handling of the epidemic. A, if not the, key 
component of their success was the role governments - and crucially Presidents - 
took in speaking out about HIV/AIDS. Up to this point, the central focus of the 
HIV/AIDS response was concerned with the medical side of the epidemic, with the 
World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) 
concentrating upon a health response, ignoring the social side effects until they 
themselves became costly health problems.8  The role of government and the state 
became a part of the agenda with the creation of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and efforts led by the United Nations to co-
ordinate all state and international structures to address the socio-economic 
causes and consequences of the epidemic. However, it was not until the World 
Bank recognised this issue and built a project of unprecedented financial 
                                                 
6 For more on understanding HIV/AIDS as a long-wave event see: T. Barnett, ‘HIV/AIDS, a long 
Wave Event: Sundering the Intergenerational Bond’ in N.K. Poku, A. Whiteside, B. Sandkjaer AIDS 
and Governance (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 29-48. 
7 See T. Barnett and A. Whiteside, AIDS in the Twenty-First Century: Disease and Globalization; 
J.C. Caldwell, I.O Orubuloye, and P. Caldwell, ‘Under-reaction to AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa’ 
Social Science and Medicine 34(11), 1992: 1169-1182; N.K. Poku, ‘Africa’s AIDS Crisis in Context: 
‘how the poor are dying’’ Third World Quarterly 22(2), 2001: 191-204.  
8 This opinion on the WHO was expressed in an interview – John Garrison, 27th April 2006, World 
Bank – Washington DC, USA – and in M.E. Ankrah, ‘AIDS and the social state of health’ Social 
Science and Medicine 32(9), 1991: 967-980.  
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magnitude and scope that the role of the state and the impact of the global 
response upon it, came to the fore.  
The Bank established its US$1billion Multi-Country AIDS Program (MAP) 
commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS in early 2000. The purpose of the MAP was to 
make funds available for any country in sub-Saharan Africa with a high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate and to engender a widespread ‘multi-sectoral’ response to the 
epidemic that involved every aspect of state and society. As such, funds were 
made available to those states that would accept and commit to the following 
conditions: presence of a national strategic plan to fight HIV/AIDS; a national co-
ordinating body; a commitment to directing 40-60 per cent of funds to civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and agreement by the government to use multiple 
implementation agencies, especially national non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and community groups. Key to the MAP’s intervention was the role of 
governments and the state, and to reflect this role the Bank implemented NACs in 
the highest political office of each of the 28 countries that have received MAP 
funding. These authorities were to co-ordinate the national response, select CSOs 
appropriate for funding, and implement the Bank’s project.9 
The MAP was the first project of its kind to establish governmental 
structures and promote the inclusion of CSOs. The project existed before Goal 6 of 
the UN Millennium Development Goals, the UN’s commitment to multi-sectoralism 
and CSO inclusion, and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Global Fund). Since its inception, the MAP’s commitment to state responses and 
multi-sectoralism has come to underpin and lead the global response to HIV/AIDS 
as evidenced in the parallels between the project and the Global Fund’s working 
mechanisms and priorities, and UNAIDS’ ‘The Three Ones’ that all actors within the 
response subscribe to.10 All bilateral donors such as the Department for 
International Development (DFID), UK, and multilateral donors such as the Global 
Fund have acknowledged and subscribed to the principle of government – in most 
cases the NACs - at the centre of the response. The most notable exception to this 
                                                 
9 World Bank, “The Multi-Country AIDS Program” (2007) accessed March 2007, available at 
www.worldbank.org/aids. 
10 ‘The Three Ones’ have become the central co-ordinating mechanism within the HIV/AIDS 
response that all actors working on the epidemic subscribe to. ‘The Three Ones’ are national and 
international commitments to: one co-ordinating body, one monitoring and evaluation system, and 
one strategic plan. See UNAIDS, Three Ones’ Key Principles – ‘Coordination of National responses 
to HIV/AIDS’ Guiding principles for national authorities and their partners (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2004). 
For how the World Bank has shaped the global response to HIV/AIDS, see S. Harman, ‘The World 
Bank: Failing the Multi-Country AIDS Program, Failing HIV/AIDS’ Global Governance 13(4), 2007: 
485 – 492. 
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trend has been the United States’ President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR), a project that commits US$15 billion to the HIV/AIDS response. 
PEPFAR does not by rule work through the pre-established state co-ordinating 
bodies such as the NACs, but does aim to strengthen systems within the Ministry 
of Health. The exceptionalism of the US in this regard does not undermine the 
central argument of this paper, but as will become evident, impacts upon the state 
rivalries and inter-agency complexities born of international intervention.  
Understood against research into HIV/AIDS interventions and governance of 
the epidemic, the prioritisation of the state appears a straightforward necessity to a 
problem that requires strong governmental leadership. What is not clear, however, 
is the impact these globally-designed state-led initiatives are having upon the 
government and the state, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, or how this 
prioritisation of the state fits into the wider governance reform agenda of the World 
Bank. Research on the Bank’s governance reform of the mid-1990s suggests that 
interventions under the rubric of ‘the fight against AIDS’ do not exist in isolation of 
the reform agendas promoted by international organisations in sub-Saharan 
African states, and moreover fit in with the Bank’s wider use of government 
ownership as a means of state reform.  
Structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and early 1990s sought to 
reduce the role of the state as a stumbling block to stringent neoliberalism. Since 
1990, international financial institutions such as the World Bank have come to see 
the state as a central vehicle in which to promote market based reforms. This shift 
in thinking has been attributed to developments in economic thinking, wider Bank 
commitments to governance reform, and the logic that economic reform can only 
occur through social development. The Bank’s approach to governance reform of 
1994 based upon capital and efficiency in public sector management, rule of law, 
accountability and transparency impacted on states in various ways. As Williams 
describes it, the Bank became engaged in ‘detailed and intrusive activities’ in 
countries in the pursuit of establishing market-based systems.11 Berlotti and Perotti 
suggest that through such reform the state encompassed a form of ‘residual 
                                                 
11 For further research on the World Bank and the African state see G. Harrison, The World Bank 
and Africa: the construction of governance states (London: Routledge, 2004); G. Harrison, ‘HIPC 
and the Architecture of Governance’ Review of African Political Economy 31(99), 2004: 125-164; G. 
Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance, and Theories of Political Action in Africa’ British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 7, 2005: 240-260; D. Williams, ‘Constructing the economic 
space: the World Bank and the making of Homo Oeconomicus’ Millennium 28(1), 1999: 79-99; M.F. 
Tuozzo, ‘World Bank, Governance Reforms, and Democracy in Argentina’ Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 23(1), 2004: 100-118; World Bank, Governance: The World Bank’s Experience 
(Washington: World Bank, 2004). 
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ownership’ wherein it adopted responsibility or ‘ownership’ of national programmes 
and priorities but became ‘progressively removed’ from direct involvement in the 
economy. According to Tuozzo, in Argentina, this approach affected the model of 
state-society relations, reducing social rights and democracy in the push for more 
market-oriented social policy. The state in terms of the government and civil 
service was reduced in the delivery of services with the Bank promoting the 
executive and the Ministry of Finance and non-governmental forms of service 
delivery.12 In Mexico, Charnock’s Marxist reading of the World Bank’s involvement 
in governance reform suggests that the state’s agenda was ideationally identical to 
that of the Bank’s second generation reform agenda of governance – that of states 
not being subjected to stringent conditionalities of ‘first generation reform’ but 
internalising the Bank’s approach to development and the political economy, i.e. 
acting in the interests of the Bank through practice, rather than through 
conditionalities – as expressed through state ownership and civil society 
partnerships. Second generation reform is encapsulated by the Comprehensive 
Development Framework and World Development Reports of the 1990s. The 
successful realisation of such reform however was limited by ‘domestic political 
squabbles’ where the managers of reform, i.e. politicians, failed fully to implement 
the Bank’s governance agenda. Charnock argues that as such, the Bank has had 
to confront the role of the state in implementing market-based reforms, to such an 
extent that it is the ‘state managers’ that enact such reforms and embed them 
within society.13 
Charnock’s use of second generation reform as a form of understanding 
shifts in governance reform and the Bank in Mexico fits with Harrison’s conception 
of the term. Harrison characterises the Bank’s shift from stringent ‘Washington 
Consensus’-typified first generation reform of conditional-based loans to an era of 
post-conditionality, second-generation reform; in which the Bank operates through 
‘governance states’ within the ‘sovereign frontier.’ In so doing, ‘governance states’ - 
typified by their attainment of ‘showcase status’ within the Bank, favourable growth 
rates, stability, ‘new beginning’-styled transition, and the prominent role of finance 
ministries - have become the central vehicles in which to embed market-based 
                                                 
12 See B. Bortolotti. and E. Perotti, ‘From Government to Regulatory Governance: Privatization and 
the Residual Role of the State’ World Bank Research Observer 22, 2007: 53-66; P. Griffin, ‘The 
World Bank’ New Political Economy 11(4), 2006: 571-581; Tuozzo et al, ‘World Bank, Governance 
Reforms, and Democracy in Argentina’. 
13 See G. Charnock, ‘Improving the mechanisms of global governance? The Ideational Impact of 
the World Bank on the National Reform Agenda in Mexico’ New Political Economy 11(1), 2006: 73-
98. 
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governance reform within sub-Saharan Africa. Harrison suggests that the Bank’s 
form of governance reform refers to the public sector’s ability to enhance economic 
growth. The Bank ‘cherry-picks’ between states with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance in 
sub-Saharan Africa which in turns divides states as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ adjusters. 
Conditionality is presented within the context of state-ownership and ‘development’ 
as a means of legitimising reforms. Sovereignty is thus being reconfigured through 
the ‘sovereign frontier’ in which it is constructed by an interplay of actors under the 
rubric of World Bank-led second generation reform. Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) are central to such interplay; embedding and legitimising this new form of 
governance and sovereignty and engaging in agendas set by donors. Similar to the 
findings of Charnock, Harrison suggests the Bank’s ability to fully enact 
governance reform is limited to the ahistorical and apolitical nature of the Bank’s 
conception of the state that produces short-term, quick-fix market solutions to 
historically-embedded issues.14  
In sum, the Bank no longer influences state interest though conditional 
lending; but is able to influence state behaviour by getting states to absorb the 
Bank’s approach to development through practice. This is what is meant by second 
generation reform. Those states that do are hailed as success-stories, 
implementing a form of good governance based on state ownership of the 
development agenda and civil society inclusion. As a result, states that engage in 
good governance behaviour receive more financial support and status within the 
international system. States are thus becoming ‘governance states’ in which their 
historical underpinnings are ignored in the pursuit of the Bank’s good governance 
agenda. 
The findings of Charnock, Harrison, Tuozzo, and Williams are pertinent to 
any understanding of HIV/AIDS governance, and in particular the prioritisation of 
the state at the forefront of the global agenda. As this paper will demonstrate, 
HIV/AIDS is used as a vehicle in which the Bank can enact its specific market-
based governance reform throughout Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and in using 
its AIDS interventions as a model for best practice, export its agenda throughout 
countries with high HIV prevalence. This paper considers this relationship between 
HIV/AIDS and the state in regard to questions of sovereignty and state/civil society 
boundaries. It does so by focusing upon the position of the President, the role of 
                                                 
14 G. Harrison, ‘HIPC and the Architecture of Governance’; G. Harrison, The World Bank and 
Africa: the construction of governance states; G. Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance, and 
Theories of Political Action in Africa’. 
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the National AIDS Councils, the rivalries between line ministries, and the 
proliferation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as the main providers of basic 
healthcare and HIV/AIDS prevention methods. 
 
The NACs and DACs: The New Armies in the War on AIDS 
National, District, Regional and Community AIDS Councils co-ordinate the national 
response to HIV/AIDS at every level of government in line with each country’s 
national strategic plan. They were established in 2000 and are a pre-requisite of 
any country in receipt of World Bank MAP funds. In keeping with the Bank’s model 
of governance reform that prioritises the executive and Ministry of Finance, these 
AIDS councils are principally housed in the Office of the President, and funded 
through the Ministry of Finance. The main role of the NACs is to co-ordinate the 
national response to HIV/AIDS by identifying those CSOs that should receive 
funds; strengthening the District AIDS Councils; working with partners to articulate 
the strategic plan; mobilising partners and working with line ministries and donors 
in strengthening capacity and filling the gaps in the national response to 
HIV/AIDS.15 The NACs are the main focal point of the HIV/AIDS response, and are 
the subject of much capacity building by UNAIDS and UNDP, and have, in some 
countries, accommodated the Global Fund’s central operative body – the country-
co-ordinating mechanisms (CCMs) within their overall structure. The NACs are 
composed of civil servants, many of whom had previous positions within the 
Ministry of Health, and most of whom have some form of public health 
postgraduate qualification. In Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda the staff of the NACs 
take the form of ‘governance habitus’ described by Harrison, wherein they are 
dominated by similar public sector elites, using training workshops and agendas 
paid for by donor money to shape the national response to HIV/AIDS.16 
The ability of the NACs to enact their own form of HIV/AIDS response has 
been mired by problems of CSO mistrust, bureaucracy, corruption, capacity, 
direction and ownership of their national responses. Each of these issues has 
undermined their ability to respond to problems within the national response and is 
underpinned by questions of sovereignty and international influence. A healthy 
                                                 
15 These findings are drawn from the following interviews: Ursula Bahati, 14th November 2005, 
National AIDS Control Council – Kenya; Julius Byenka, 11th October 2005, Uganda HIV/AIDS 
Commission – Uganda; Hashim Kalinga, 14th February 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania; Joseph 
Temba, 10th February 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania; Rustica Tembele, 6th January 2006, TACAIDS – 
Tanzania. 
16 G. Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance, and theories of political action in Africa’ 
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mistrust exists between the NACs and CSOs. Interviews with CSOs within East 
Africa suggest that this mistrust is based upon specific CSOs’ views that the NACs 
are political entities conditioned by wider government spending plans and 
objectives or a political institution that distorts outcomes and achievements to make 
the government look successful. CSOs, such as the National Guidance and 
Empowerment Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NGEN+) in Uganda, prefer 
not to be involved in the Uganda National AIDS Council – the Uganda AIDS 
Commission (UAC)’s - partnership committees as once involved they have to agree 
to government policy and its financial and political ‘monopoly’ of the AIDS agenda 
under collective responsibility, when in certain instances the government acts 
against the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs). Other CSOs interpret 
the actions of the NACs as directed by donor demands, and that for states to 
realise their objectives in the response to HIV/AIDS they must be more dynamic in 
the management of such demand. Competing demands reduce the NACs’ 
disposition to actual governance of community empowerment, thus reducing the 
already limited space for social activity that exists in East African society. CSOs 
feel that mistrust could be better managed by CSOs through improved co-
ordination; presence within the community to gain first hand experience of the 
problems CSOs face; greater publicity of their work, and the promotion of 
transparent funding methods to get rid of ‘briefcase NGOs’. These factors would 
minimise mistrust and as a consequence strengthen the response at the national 
level.17 
A commonly perceived problem within state sponsored activity in sub-
Saharan Africa is corruption. The perception of corruption presents a powerful 
obstacle to the effectiveness of the NACs. In 2005, Uganda was tarnished by the 
Global Fund’s withdrawal of support resulting from the discovery of mis-managed 
funds by independent auditors PriceWaterhouseCoopers. The Global Fund 
suspended all of its five grants to Uganda until the Ministry of Finance had 
established a structure that would ensure effective management of the funds. This 
issue has since been rectified, and the Global Fund was quickly re-established in 
the country. The Global Fund issue was minor in comparison to the problems 
                                                 
17 These findings were drawn from the following interviews: Duncan Hervey, 27th January 2006, 
Save the Children – Zanzibar; Dorothy Kalioli, 4th January 2006, Dogodogo Centre – Tanzania; 
Barabona Mubondo, 20th January 2006, WAMATA – Tanzania; Victor Mulimila, 17th January 2006, 
Faraja Trust Fund – Tanzania; Eve Mwai, 29th November 2005, St John’s Ambulance – Kenya; 
Patrick Ogen, 19th October 2005, Youth Alive – Uganda; Rubaramira Ruranga, 31st October 2005, 
NGEN+ - Uganda; Kenneth Simbaya, 7th February 2006, SPW – Tanzania; Nick Southern, 9th 
January 2006, Care International – Tanzania. 
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experienced by the Kenyan National AIDS Council – the National AIDS Control 
Council (NACC) - and the country’s wider reputation for corruption.18 Levels of 
misappropriation were such that national NGOs alleged the then Head of the 
NACC was reputedly paying herself KSh2million (approximately UK£13,500) out of 
MAP funds earmarked for the community. This allegation was supported by The 
Lancet that revealed the total sum of head of the NACC Gachara’s financial 
impropriety was obtaining US$315,789 (approximately UK£157,894) in salary. The 
corruption scandal led to all senior NACC management having to re-apply for their 
jobs, removing the NACC’s funding decision-making capability, the then Head of 
the Council being imprisoned, and an external audit conducted by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. CSOs were consulted, involved and recruited within the 
re-hiring process.19 The NACC continues to face accusations of preferential 
treatment to CSOs of similar tribal identity and there are claims that ‘there have 
been bigger thefts than that of the NACC’, although there is no clear evidence of 
this happening.20 
The bureaucratic structures and processes within the NACs make corruption 
hard to detect. Bureaucracy complicates transparency and perceptions of NAC 
activity and thus does little to dispel CSO concerns over corruption. Upon 
implementation, the structures and processes of the NACs were cumbersome and 
bureaucratic as management units, they added an additional layer of bureaucracy 
to already complex government-donor relations. The levels of day-to-day 
bureaucratic inertia range within the NACs: TACAIDS (Tanzania Commission for 
HIV/AIDS) seems consistent in its processes, deadlines and ability to keep 
appointments, UAC follows a similar pattern in consistency and transparency, yet 
could be problematic in terms of deadlines and appointments, however, the 
bureaucratic structures of the Kenyan NACC resemble a complex ad-hoc system of 
protocol that is seemingly without process or procedure, varying by the day. 
Access to information depends on whom you engaged with in the NACC, with 
some individuals being open; some changing the requirements necessary as if 
                                                 
18 In 2005 Sir Edward Clay, the then UK High Commissioner to Kenya made a speech documenting 
the levels of corruption within the Kenya government, accusing the government of bribery, 
accounting for 8% of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), that is undermining Kenya’s 
economic growth and donor aid commitments. Such an accusation made international headlines 
because of the comment ‘they can hardly expect us not to care when their gluttony causes them to 
vomit all over our shoes’ (BBC News, 2004). The issue of corruption was also discussed in an 
interview with Steve Kinzett from John Snow International - 23rd November 2005, in Kenya. 
19 Parts of this process were described in the following interviews: Anne Austen, 18th November 
2005, Futures Group – Kenya; Eve Mwai, 29th November 2005, St John’s Ambulance – Kenya. 
20 Rowland Lenya, 10th November 2005, TAPWAK – Kenya. 
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they were making them up, and other representatives denying any knowledge of 
individuals or previous processes.21  
The institutional capacity of the NACs have been marked by under-funding, 
lack of staff and a rapid accumulation of responsibility, for example in Tanzania 
‘TACAIDS is still put upon in this country… its just volume of expectation… it is 
simply the expectation of that organisation, and that doesn’t mean they deliberately 
don’t fulfil that requirement, its just unrealistic’ therefore TACAIDS has to operate in 
limited space. Initially established to manage the MAP, the NACs now have the 
responsibility of bilateral basket funds, the Global Fund and co-ordinating all 
HIV/AIDS activities in-country. International organisations such as UNAIDS and 
CSOs view this as a result of their inability to delegate responsibility to their 
partners, such as the Ministry of Health. Staff members within the NACs are 
targeted as lacking the skills and ability needed to support the community and 
partner CSOs effectively.22 Capacity issues are the responsibility, not the fault, of 
the NACs. Fault lies in the design and responsibilities placed upon them by 
international donors, principally the Bank, and CSOs arising out of the 
empowerment and government-ownership models advocated by such donors. The 
need for one co-ordinating body within the response, the rapid demands of funding 
disbursal, preference towards CSO funding not government funding, and the 
multiplicity of actors involved in the response, all place stress upon the NACs’ 
capacity and confuse their initial mandate. 
Confusion as to the NACs’ mandate exists over their role as co-ordinators of 
the national response and implementers of the MAP. Representatives of the NACs, 
the World Bank and UN agencies all stress that the NAC’s role is co-ordination not 
implementation. However, in articulating the strategic plan, selecting those CSOs 
to receive MAP funds, monitoring and training the DACs, and strengthening public 
sector responses, the NACs are heavily involved in operational implementation. 
                                                 
21 These findings are based on interviews with Hanningtone Kataka, 23rd November 2005, 
KUSCCO – Kenya; and Yasmin Tayyab, 24th April 2006, World Bank – Washington DC, USA; and 
extensive visits to the NACC: in one instance the NACC was open to participation in the Joint 
Annual HIV/AIDS Programme Review and were extremely accommodating and helpful in this 
respect; the corollary of this was attempting to access information on the District Technical 
Committees and being told that the information i.e. names and addresses were classified without a 
letter of introduction from the British High Commission, British Council or whoever they then chose. 
In a separate incident when attending the NAC for information on the NGOs nationally funded under 
the MAP the researcher was left waiting for 6 hours after being told the person she needed was in a 
meeting, and then eventually that that person had gone home. 
22 This opinion was expressed in interviews with: Emmanuel Malangalila, 20th January 2006, World 
Bank – Tanzania; Alex Pius Margery, 6th January 2006, TANEPHA – Tanzania; Barabona 
Mubondo, 20th January 2006, WAMATA – Tanzania; Nick Southern, 9th January 2006, Care 
International – Tanzania. 
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Initially the NACs were not supposed to engage in such activities, but the demands 
of the MAP resulted in them doing so: MAP-1 established the NACs as 
implementers and MAP-2 reinforced this role. The NACs present their roles as co-
ordination, but on further enquiry admit that they have become involved – 
unintentionally – in implementation. This presents a conflict of interests, confusion, 
and over-burden on the part of the NACs, rendering them unable to do either co-
ordination or implementation successfully. As co-ordinating bodies, the NACs 
should not house projects as it contravenes their legal mandate. This is 
problematic in the NACs wider relations with CSOs, as in implementing the project 
the NACs are directly competing for funds with the project’s traditional 
implementation partners – CSOs. 23 
The key factor that underpins the problems surrounding NAC capacity and 
their mandate is the discrepancy over ownership. Contrary to Bank and NAC 
affirmations of state ownership of the MAP and the national strategic plans, such 
ownership is articulated and directed by the Bank and international donors. The 
objectives and CSO engagement structures within the NACs were first created by 
the World Bank, and have since been developed by international organisations and 
donors under the rubric of ‘capacity building’. This is evident in the Bank’s 
implementation of the MAP in East Africa. First, the Bank used the MAP to 
establish or re-craft the NACs. The UAC in Uganda technically existed previous to 
the MAP but underwent an institutional reform and is now fully funded by the Bank 
under MAP funds, the NACC in Kenya is funded by the Bank and only existed in 
discussion paper form before the MAP, and TACAIDS in Tanzania was established 
under the MAP but is supported by government funds. In Mozambique, a co-
ordinating body already existed within the government, however the task team 
leader of the MAP had to keep to the overall blueprint and insisted on establishing 
an additional body and subsequently causing friction with the government, if the 
government had refused it would have not received the badly needed funds.  In the 
UAC, once work-plans were articulated they had to be approved by the Bank, once 
the CSO proposals were reviewed the UAC prepared recommendations for 
                                                 
23 This opinion was expressed in interviews with: Anne Austen, 18th November 2005, Futures Group 
– Kenya; Ursula Bahati, 14th November 2005, National AIDS Control Council – Kenya; Amy 
Cunningham, 25th October 2005, USAID – Uganda; Morris Lekule, 4th January 2006, TACAIDS – 
Tanzania; Emmanuel Malangalila, 20th January 2006, World Bank – Tanzania; Nadeem 
Mohammed, 24th April 2006, World Bank – Washington DC, USA; Herbert Mugumya, 1st November 
2005, Save the Children – Uganda; Victor Mulimila, 17th January 2006, Faraja Trust Fund – 
Tanzania; Rustica Tembele, 6th January 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania; Debrework Zewdie, 3rd May 
2006, World Bank – Washington DC, USA; Deus Kibamba, 20th January 2006, TGNP – Tanzania; 
Steve Kinzett, 23rd November 2005, JSI – Kenya. 
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approval to the Bank, and once the MAP was accepted, the UAC had to sign an 
agreement to support CSOs. In Tanzania, TACAIDS found the US$34million out of 
the US$50million MAP budget earmarked to line ministries disproportionate to that 
of the community fund. However the Bank has not changed its position on the 
funding. In all three cases state-level response to HIV/AIDS was inactive. The 
central objective of the Bank was to use MAP funds to give states ‘the push that 
was needed’ to facilitate a high-level political commitment. Thus not only did the 
Bank use the MAP as a catalyst for the NACs inception, it promoted an agenda 
that structured NAC practice alongside Bank working principles.24 
Upon implementation of the MAP at country-level states did not have a role 
in articulating the project’s main objectives. States are only able to articulate the 
agenda by choosing to accept the terms and conditions of the initial contract. When 
asked how the UACP was devised, Peter Okwero, the World Bank’s task team 
leader in Uganda, responded ‘I can’t really say how it developed, it just came by 
itself… the Bank did not come with any idea, I don’t think the government came 
with any particular idea’25 The Kenyan Bank team were adamant that ‘the Bank has 
no objectives behind the TWOA, it is the government, we are supporting the 
government. That’s the point, and don’t forget it’26 The task team leader for 
Tanzania provided a more contradictory response to the question of ownership, 
suggesting it should be the Tanzanian government that designs the project, but in 
practice it is always the Bank, 
The preparation has to be with the country. Actually the project should be prepared, ideally it 
should be prepared by the government, ideally, you know, we are not preparing the project as 
a Bank, I mean this is, but in most cases you find that it is the Bank preparing, doing most of 
it, it is supposed to be the government preparing a project and the Bank assisting, providing 
you know, assisting the country to prepare a project, so that there is ownership of that 
project, right from the word go and throughout the implementation and even after 
implementation. So that is how it should look like but for most of the projects of the Bank you 
will find that because of the capacities of the country a lot is being done by the Bank.27 
The requirement to channel 40-60 per cent of funds to CSOs was heavily resisted 
by the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, who have little practice of 
CSO engagement fostered by mutual distrust and dislike. As such, the Bank made 
states recognise the role CSOs had in the national responses to HIV/AIDS and the 
need to adopt a new approach to development work. The Bank was able to make 
                                                 
24 Julius Byenka, 11th October 2005, Uganda HIV/AIDS Commission – Uganda; Morris Lekule, 4th 
January 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania; Peter Okwero, 1st November 2005, World Bank – Uganda; 
Albertus Voetberg, 15th November 2005, World Bank – Kenya; Debrework Zewdie, 3rd May 2006, 
World Bank – Washington DC, USA. 
25  Peter Okwero, 1st November 2005, World Bank – Uganda. 
26 Adam Lagerstedt, 16th November 2005, World Bank – Kenya. 
27 Emmanuel Malangalila, 20th January 2006, World Bank – Tanzania. 
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states recognise the use of CSOs and adopt suitable mechanisms of engagement 
through the promise of desperately needed funds. Hence, the imposition of the 
CSO principle and the NACs under the MAP represented stringent conditionalities. 
Keen to dispel any use of conditionality on account of its association with 
controversial structural adjustment policy, ACT Africa avoided the issue by 
stressing that requirements such as the implementation of the NACs were not a 
conditionality, preferring to characterise such influence as ‘arm twisting’ or working 
with NACs to ‘remind them ruthlessly’ of their role.28 
The origins, roles, and problems of the NACs reveal several key concerns 
over state sovereignty and the impact of international financial commitments and 
organisations upon the state. First, the creation of a Bank-funded governmental 
body at the height of political office, established to implement a Bank mandate, 
presents an unprecedented and significant confrontation of state boundaries within 
understandings of global governance. The NACs are characteristic of the second 
generation reform measures depicted by Harrison and Charnock in which the Bank 
utilises government agencies to implement its reform packages through 
subscription to, and ownership of, a shared ideology. The national application of 
the MAP represents a sophisticated incarnation of such reform through its 
systematic use of CSOs and a specific form of CSO empowerment model. Second, 
this creation is undermining state objectives and government legitimacy, which 
ultimately threatens a governments’ position within its electorate. The ability of 
state structures such as the NACs to respond to community concerns are bounded 
by the conditionalities agreed upon at the outset of donor funding commitments. 
Under the rubric of state ownership, states have to assume responsibility and 
implement what is perceived by international organisations to be in the state’s best 
interest. If government objectives refute donor interests or the mandate prescribed 
for them to implement, governments are framed in a moralistic renunciation of their 
commitment to help the sick. Third, the ahistorical and apolitical nature of the Bank 
has established the NACs in isolation of any real understanding of the state in each 
of the three countries examined or the relationship between state and civil society, 
as such, similar to Charnock’s depiction of governance reform in Mexico, ‘domestic 
squabbles’ have restricted the NACs ability to implement the Bank’s project. 
                                                 
28 This opinion was expressed in interviews with Bank staff both in country and in Washington: 
Emmanuel Malangalila, 20th January 2006, World Bank – Tanzania; Nadeem Mohammed, 24th April 
2006, World Bank – Washington DC, USA; Debrework Zewdie, 3rd May 2006, World Bank – 
Washington DC, USA. 
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Fourth, as we would expect under the Bank’s wider governance reform structures, 
state attention towards the provision of basic services is channelled to the non-
state sector, and the emergence of service economies throughout the country, as 
opposed to strengthening state mechanisms directly. The desperate situation 
HIV/AIDS has led to, binds governments in a vicious cycle of dependency upon 
foreign aid and a loss of sovereignty that infers a growing legitimacy upon non-
state and international interventions. This situation is enhanced by competition and 
mistrust between state agencies, and the decline of the health sector.  
 
Ministries of Health: The Old Guard 
The implementation and prioritisation of multi-sectoral approaches to HIV/AIDS 
with NACs at the centre of leading state responses has undermined the position 
and capacity of traditional state agencies, most notably, the Ministries of Health. In 
all three countries studied, the Ministry of Health provides the technical arm of the 
response; addressing medical issues of anti-retroviral therapy (ART), opportunistic 
infections, voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (PMTCT), procurement, logistics, and technical support for hospitals 
and health centres. Each of the Ministries of Health, except Uganda, have a 
special HIV/AIDS section: National STD and HIV/AIDS Control Programme 
(NASCOP) of Kenya; National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) in Tanzania; and 
Zanzibar AIDS Control Programme (ZACP) in Zanzibar. However, the global 
response did not consider these agencies as suitable actors in which to co-ordinate 
the response due to a commitment to non-health based responses and the 
problems faced by Ministries of Health across the region. In Tanzania, the Ministry 
of Health reflects the knock-on impact of structural adjustment, in that 40% of 
health staff positions are under-filled. Managerially, Ministries of Health are seen as 
inefficient throughout the world. In countries such as Nigeria, the public health 
system has all but collapsed. These systems are strengthened with WHO technical 
support, resource mobilisation, training materials, and policy guidance. However 
they remain clinically oriented with few sectoral ministries accepting their authority. 
The Bank justifies the introduction of the NACs through the need for a regulating 
body that prioritised a multi-sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS alongside the health 
sector dimension.29 
                                                 
29 This justification was expressed in multiple interviews: Awene Gavyole, 13th February 2006, WHO 
– Tanzania; Morris Lekule, 4th January 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania; Chudi Okafor, 27th April 2006, 
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The shift in focus from a medical to a multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS 
resulted in a contention between the NACs and the Ministries of Health. This 
contention was in part based upon an overlap in implementation and an unclear 
delineation of roles and responsibilities. A great force for contention was over who 
had ultimate authority over the national response, principally arising out of who had 
greater funds. In terms of authority, a representative of USAID in Uganda 
described the Ministry of Health as ‘pissed’ that they did not house the Uganda 
MAP. The conflict between these two agencies is widely recognised as problematic 
in that they do not work together generating further overlap and distrust.30 
However, despite suggestion of conflict, representatives of the NACs and the 
Ministries of Health acknowledge a degree of initial animosity but then consistently 
state their co-operative relationship, as Rustica Tembele of TACAIDS describes 
the relationship, ‘for me, we are just a wedding’  and issue examples of their joint 
working practices and inter-linkages between staff and committees.31  
The division and conflict between the Ministries of Health and the NACs has 
been heightened by the arrival of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) and a re-medicalisation of the epidemic. PEPFAR is a US$15 billion, 
five year strategy that integrates care, treatment and prevention programmes 
across the world, with a focus upon rapid disbursement and results, that is, large 
commitments to the provision of anti-retroviral therapy (ART), and strengthening 
Ministry of Health capacity. Its main expenditures are channelled to the 
management of the chronically ill, which is seen as problematic and economically 
unviable in terms of productive years added and the benefits of prevention. The 
financial capacity alone has led the US subsequently to dominate HIV/AIDS efforts 
at the risk of UN marginalisation. To stress its relevance, it has been suggested 
that the UN must now align its interests and activities within a US led framework. 
PEPFAR does not function within pre-established processes or co-ordination 
                                                                                                                                                     
World Bank – Washington DC, USA; Nick Southern, 9th January 2006, Care International – 
Tanzania. 
30 This opinion was expressed in interviews with: Bob Duolf, 4th January 2006, Care International – 
Tanzania; Duncan Hervey, 27th January 2006, Save the Children – Zanzibar; Carole Kariuki, 16th 
December 2005, Kenya Private Sector Alliance – Kenya; Deus Kibamba, 20th January 2006, TGNP 
– Tanzania; Samuel Nyantahe, 9th January 2006, Utegi Technical Enterprises – RFA Dar es 
Salaam, Mara, Shinyanga – Tanzania; Aisling Quiery, 21st December 2005, Merlin. 
31 The need to express co-operation was expressed in interviews with multiple government actors: 
Stella Chale, 10th January 2006, NACP – Tanzania; Dorcus Kameta, 11th November 2005, 
NASCOP – Kenya; Emmanuel Malangalila, 20th January 2006, World Bank – Tanzania; Idi Saadat, 
31st January 2006, Zanzibar HIV/AIDS Commission – Zanzibar; Joseph Temba, 10th February 2006, 
TACAIDS – Tanzania; Rustica Tembele, 6th January 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania. 
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mechanisms such as the NACs, yet it does integrate system strengthening and 
procurement practices within health ministries to facilitate the widespread scaling 
up of anti-retroviral treatment. The financial commitment of PEPFAR and its shift 
away from the NAC approach assists in the schizophrenic position of governments 
trying to appease multiple international actors, whilst maintaining their own 
objectives and political mandates. The consequence of this is further division and 
competition of state agencies to prove their legitimacy not only to central 
government - as is often the case within line ministries wanting to secure parts of 
the state budget - but to the priorities of international donors. Divisions between 
state agencies and the balance governments must strike between international 
initiatives and national priorities are made more complex by the mushrooming of 
non-state actors, and the impact their role within service delivery has upon the 
functioning and role of the state. The decline of the Ministry of Health as a result of 
the introduction of the NACs is characteristic of the Bank’s governance reform, in 
which it promotes bodies within the executive, and stresses new forms of 
ownership as replacement to existing structures and political cultures. However, 
bilateral money and the ‘old guard’ political structures of the state promote 
competition, but not the sort the Bank wants to promote free-market economic 
practice.  
 
CSOs, the State and the Service Economy 
At the core of multi-sectoral responses to HIV/AIDS has been the role of CSOs as 
key forms of service delivery. CSOs in this regard refers to community groups of 
varying scale and size, national NGOs, regional networks, and international non-
governmental organisations. Projects such as the MAP, international non-
governmental organisation, and Global Fund grants specifically target CSOs in-
country to provide a variety of care, treatment, prevention and support services. 
The types of CSO ‘empowered’ through HIV/AIDS interventions are community 
groups that do not pose any significant threat to the Bank’s mandate.32 This has 
led to the upsurge of civil society actors throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and it is 
the role of the government and state structures such as the National, District and 
Community AIDS Councils to monitor and facilitate their involvement. Relations 
                                                 
32 See A. Bebbington, D. Lewis, S. Batterbury, E. Olson, M.S. Siddiqi, ‘Of texts and practices: 
Empowerment and Organisational Cultures in World Bank-funded Rural Development Programmes’ 
Journal of Development Studies 43(4), 2007: 597-621. 
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between governments and civil society within sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the 
case study countries, have been traditionally marked by distrust. However, under 
the ‘ruthless reminders’ (as conditionalities were referred to in an interview with a 
member of the World Bank’s AIDS Campaign Team Africa) of the Bank and 
international influence, governments not only have to reach out to CSOs, but 
accommodate them within wider state structures of health, education and the 
Office of the President. States have thus become the managers of non-state 
actors, mapping their work, sponsoring their activities, and then monitoring their 
interests, needs and success as if they were a central part of the state structure. 
This point is particularly pertinent when looking at the inter-relationship between 
District and Community AIDS Councils and international non-governmental 
organisations. 
In response to problems with funding disbursement from the government to 
the community, NACs in some of the MAP countries have established Regional 
Facilitating Agents (RFAs). The introduction of these agents was made in response 
to suggestions by the Bank to speed up funding disbursal through the use of 
private consultancies or international non-governmental organisations. The RFAs 
would operate as an extension of the NACs’ mandate thus increasing the working 
capacity of the MAP and the national strategic plans at the national and district 
level. The central role of RFAs is to build the capacity of the regional secretariat, 
the Local Government Authority (LGA), the DACs and the community and oversee 
and co-ordinate the overall implementation of the MAP community component. 
RFAs build capacity by mapping the number of CSOs in the area, their activities, 
shortfalls and successes, demonstrating successful models for implementation and 
monitoring of projects to both the DACs and the community, assisting the DACs 
with project appraisal and subsequently disbursing funds to communities. The 
RFAs see their central role as facilitators of community participation.33 As private 
actors, the RFAs have become an extension of the state, and work in line with 
international donor-led, government mandates. What we thus see, is a mechanism 
introduced by international donors to conduct and implement the mandate of 
international donors, within the sovereign structures of the state and individual 
                                                 
33 This opinion was expressed in interviews with the following RFAs: Robert Mukama, 8th February 
2006, RFA Iringa and Ruvuma – Tanzania; Nicodemus B. Mwaduma, 6th January 2006, RFA Lindi 
and Mtwara – Tanzania; Rustica Tembele, 6th January 2006, TACAIDS – Tanzania. 
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governments’ mandates to wage a war on AIDS through the disbursal of funds to 
the community at the district and local levels.  
The omnipresence of CSO groups, particularly community based 
organisations within sub-Saharan Africa sees a shift in the types of economies 
promoted by the Bank through state structures. What has emerged in response to 
the large sums of money channelled to HIV/AIDS is an AIDS business, in which 
economies of production are shifting to service economies, and the establishment 
of CSOs as a means of profit-making activity. Profit in this sense does not refer to 
substantial capital gain, but does enable unemployed workers to gain a low salary, 
globally-inferred prestige of working in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and in some 
cases a company four-wheel drive vehicle. This vision is re-enforced and to a 
degree sanctioned by the state in the quantity of money it directs to this service 
economy, and the form of ‘residual ownership’ adopted by the state in which basic 
services are provided for by the CSO-led private sector.  
 
Presidents and the War on AIDS 
The adoption of the Bank’s HIV/AIDS projects and the success of state-led 
interventions are dependent upon the role of the President. Since the inception of 
the MAP, and the increased availability of HIV/AIDS financing, Presidents within 
sub-Saharan Africa such as Mwai Kibaki of Kenya, Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania, 
and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda have all called for a ‘war on AIDS’. Museveni was 
unique in the leadership role in combating HIV/AIDS at the outset of his 
Presidency, which has since become a key component in Uganda’s labelling as a 
‘success story’ in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Explanations as to why Museveni 
adopted such a role are blurred. A popular argument is that at the time of 
Museveni’s rise to power through military coup in 1985, soldiers and civilians 
began to exhibit symptoms of HIV/AIDS. Aware of the fragility of his power – and 
according to rumours in Uganda, under the advice of Fidel Castro -  Museveni 
sought to encourage voluntary testing and counselling first within the army and 
then within the wider aspects of society as a means of maintaining political stability. 
What is clear, however, is that Museveni’s role led to wider financial commitments 
and support from the donor community. Those Presidents and states that were 
willing to declare ‘war’ against the epidemic were seen as appropriate countries in 
which to invest resources and  become prioritised by institutions such as the World 
Bank, as models of best practice in terms of intervention.  
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Presidents must be seen to commit to combat stigma to receive donor 
funding and approval from the international community that the country is taking 
the epidemic seriously and is thus willing to commit to international objectives. This 
in itself does not lead to any systematic reconfiguration of the state, or breaches of 
sovereignty, however it is the associated measures conditional to donor funding to 
which Presidents commit that ultimately undermines their leadership and position 
of power. The crisis of HIV/AIDS in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda re-iterates leaders’ dependence on foreign aid, and the latent governance 
reform measures inherent to HIV/AIDS interventions. 
 
Conclusion: What Does this Mean for the State? 
The multi-sectoral approach to combating HIV/AIDS led by the World Bank, 
adopted by the international community, and articulated as the global response, is 
having the following effects on the state in sub-Saharan Africa. First, it is 
positioning the role of the President as a ceremonious head of state that publicly 
promotes the international agenda on HIV/AIDS, and endorses donor-led state 
strategies to combat the epidemic. Second, the need to prioritise HIV/AIDS as a 
development project has given international organisations license to transcend 
sovereign boundaries and establish agencies of international organisations within 
the state structure. Third, this transcendence of boundaries has been extended to 
the community level, with civil society actors becoming intertwined with the service 
sector aspect of state provision. As such these actors promote and internalise the 
initiatives of international organisations and donors, once more under the 
justification of the HIV/AIDS emergency.  
The impact of the HIV/AIDS response upon changes in government, state 
structures and boundaries confronts both how this dynamic is important to 
understanding the governance of HIV/AIDS and its implications, and the need to 
consider the unprecedented nature of this financial and global political commitment 
when attempting to make any theoretical conception of the state in sub-Saharan 
Africa. HIV/AIDS is only one aspect of government activity, and thus to talk of 
reconfiguration may be rash. However, the epidemic is a snapshot of the 
interventions of international financial institutions and the paradox between state 
ownership and conditionality under the World Bank’s governance reform agenda. 
The MAP is a clear example of the implementation of this reform through a specific 
social policy that by its very nature as a multi-sectoral public health issue has wider 
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ramifications for the state. However, the success of the project is limited by the 
ahistorical and apolitical underpinnings of it, in which it ignores the context and 
culture of the state within which it operates. This has ultimately limited the ability of 
the AIDS response fully to shift the dynamic of state activity as divisions or 
‘domestic squabbles’ reduce its wider absorption.  
Taken in the context of the global aspect and financial commitments of what 
constitutes the AIDS response these findings have several repercussions. First, in 
underpinning the central foundations of global AIDS policy, the Bank’s governance 
reform will continue to impact on states with high HIV prevalence. Second, the 
shortcomings of the project will ultimately undermine international interventions. 
This may lead to states designing and implementing their own policies; however, 
dependence on the high level of foreign aid would suggest that national 
interventions would also fail. Third, understandings of the role of the state in the 
epidemic need critically to consider the role of international donors and 
organisations within the context of their wider reform and ideological policies. 
Ignoring the power relationship between the state and international organisations 
will reduce the ability to tackle the long-term socio-economic consequences of 
HIV/AIDS and its devastating effect on countries with high prevalence rates.  
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